FISH 506C (3 credits; Section 001) Fisheries Economics
Course Instructor: Dr
Rashid Sumaila, Fisheries Centre, UBC
Schedule: Term 2, Wednesdays 9 am-12 noon
Place: Room 107, Aquatic Ecosystems Research Laboratory
(AERL), 2202 Main Mall
Duration and credit:
Course grading will be based on written assignments.
Content:
The course consists of three parts:
1. Bioeconomic theory of fisheries;
2. Game-theoretic approaches to the management of shared resources;
3. Topical issues in fisheries economics and management.
Bioeconomic theory
The course begins with a discussion of environmental and natural resource
economics and how fisheries economics fits into the general picture. This
is followed by a discussion of the theory underlying fisheries economics.
Bioeconomic theory of fisheries will be presented using simple models. These
models will be used to introduce fundamental economic results, such as the
importance of cost relationships and the consequences of open access. Fisheries
regulations will be an integral part of the course. Regulatory regimes such
as taxes, quotas (including ITQs) and marine protected areas will be discussed.
Game theory
Most fish stocks are shared between two or more countries. Moreover,
some stocks straddle into the high seas, where they are subject to exploitation
by many nations. The game theory part of this course will introduce methods
for analyzing strategic choices among agents who share a common fish stock.
The most relevant setting is where a number of countries share fish stocks
that migrate between the exclusive economic zones of the countries. This approach
could also be relevant where a number of firms have exclusive access to a
common stock within a country. Straddling fish stocks, exploited by coastal
states as well as distant water fishing nations, will also be discussed.
Topical issues in fisheries: Modeling and quantification
Four currently topical issues will be discussed here, namely, (i)
fisheries subsidies: types, magnitude, and impacts on resource sustainability;
(ii) illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing: scope, magnitude, stock
sustainability effects and the economic incentives facing IUU fishers; (iii)
global fish values: magnitudes and trends; and (iv) economics of fish stock
rebuilding and discounting.
Preliminary reading list
Bioeconomic theory and applications
Anderson, Lee G. (1986). The economics of fisheries management chapters
1 & 2. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
Copes, P. (1986). A critical review of the individual quota as a device in
fisheries management. Land Econ. 62, 278-291.
Clark, C.W. (1990). Mathematical bioeconomics: The optimal management of renewable
resources Pages 1- 67, 2nd ed., Wiley Interscience, New York.
Field, B. and N. Olewiler (2002). Environmental Economics, Chapters 1 &
3, 2nd Canadian ed., McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2002.
Gordon, H.S. (1954). The economic theory of common property resource: the
fishery. Journal of Political Economy, 62: 124-143.
Hartwick, J.M. and N.D. Olewiler (2002). Chapter 5. The Economics of Natural
Resource Use, 2nd ed., Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc.
Lauck, T., Clark, C., Mangel, M. and Munro, G. (1998). Implementing the precautionary
principle in fisheries management through marine reserves, Ecological Applications,
8, S72-S78.
Sumaila, U.R. and A. Charles (2002). Economic models of marine protected areas:
An introduction. Natural Resource Modeling 15(3), 261-272.
Game theory and applications
Binmore, K. (1992). Fun and games: A text on game theory. D.C. Heath
and Company. Toronto. Chapter 1, 1-21.
Munro, G.R. (1979). The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources.
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 12, 355 - 376.
Vislie, J. (1987). On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources:
A Comment on Munro's Paper. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 20, 870 - 875.
Munro, G.R. (1987). The Management of Shared Fisheries Resources under Extended
Fisheries Jurisdiction, Marine Resource Economics, 3, 271-96.
Sumaila, U.R. (1999). A review of game theoretic models of fishing. Marine
Policy, 23(1), 1-10.
Topical issues in fisheries: Modeling and quantification
Clark, C.W., G. Munro and U.R. Sumaila (2005). Subsidies, buybacks,
and sustainable fisheries. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
50, 47-58.
Munro, G. and U.R. Sumaila (2002). The impact of subsidies upon fisheries
management and sustainability: The case of the North Atlantic. Fish and Fisheries,
3, 233-290.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal of
Political Economy, 76( 2), 169-212.
Sutinen, J.G., K. Kuperan, (1999). A socioeconomic theory of regulatory compliance
in fisheries', International Journal of Social Economics, 26, 174-193.
Sumaila, U.R, J. Alder and H. Keith (2006). Global scope and economics of
illegal fishing. Marine Policy, 30(6), 696-703.
Sumaila, U.R., D. Marsden, R. Watson and D. Pauly (in press). Global Ex-Vessel
Fish Price Database: Construction, Spatial and Temporal Applications. Journal
of Bioeconomics.
Berman, M. and U.R. Sumaila (2006). Discounting, amenity values and marine
ecosystem restoration. Marine Resource Economics, 21 (2), 211-219.
Sumaila, U.R. and C. Walters (2005). Intergenerational discounting: A new
intuitive approach. Ecological Economics, 52, 135-142.
